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Abstract
This paper describes the implementation of a library for the management and evaluation of Role-based
Trust Management (RT) credentials and policies written in RTML, also extended with weights, in mobile
devices. In particular, it describes the implementation of the library in J2ME. It is worth noticing, that
RTML credentials are XML-like documents and thus the capability of porting these features on mobile
devices makes the overall framework very interoperable with other RT frameworks (as for GRID systems).
As policy language, we use actually a variant of RTML, whose policies are added with weights and are able
to express quantitative experience-based notions of trust. It allow also to encode certain reputation and
recommendation models. The obtained results show how the implementation on mobile devices is feasible
and the running time acceptable for several applications.
Keywords: role-based trust management, reputation, mobile devices, policy language, computer security.
1 Introduction
Trust management is a promising approach to authorize entities in open, distributed,
heterogenous computer environments. Trustworthiness of the entity determines ac-
cess permissions. Trust value is assigned to every entity and based on credentials
the peer possesses and/or experience accumulated by previous interactions with
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the peer. A credential certiﬁes some attributes (e.g. roles)issued to the peer by
an attribute authority. Accessing the resource the peer usually needs to present
a set of credentials signed by multiple decentralized authorities. Role-based trust
management (RT) framework [8,7,6] is especially suitable for attribute-based access
control in large-scale, distributed systems with decentralized attribute authorities.
RT exploits a notion of a role as peer’s attribute that can be delegated. We ex-
tended RT assigning a trust measure or weight to peer’s roles in order to incorporate
experience-based trust capabilities [9]. The prototype, RT’s credentials and policies
enhanced with trust weights and the evaluation engine, is described in this paper
and was successfully implemented on mobile devices.
Several trust management frameworks supporting attribute-based authorization
have been proposed last years, e.g. RT, PolicyMaker [1], KeyNote [2], SPKI [3],
etc. We concentrate on RT as it has some speciﬁc advantages. RT constitutes
a declarative, logic-based semantic foundation, support for vocabulary agreement,
strongly-typed credentials and policies, more ﬂexible authority delegation structures
[7]. RT is a theoretically-based and practically-implementable approach which en-
compasses role-based access control (RBAC) and trust management. Flexibility
and expressiveness of RT framework bases on the notion of role exploited in the
assignment of access permissions to the role’s holder. RT assumes delegated, linked
and parameterized roles.
Heterogenous computer environment compounds various types of devices inter-
acting with each other to accomplish some particular goal. To use RT authorization
framework and to allow peers interoperate seamlessly we need implement RT on dif-
ferent devices and platforms. RT framework has been successfully implemented and
deployed in several environments [4,7]. In this paper, we focus on the implemen-
tation of RT framework on mobile devices supported J2ME. Original semantics of
RT policies and credentials written in RTML policy language [5] was extended by
trust weight associated with the role. We also introduced an algorithm to compute
trust weight’s values for roles. As a matter of fact, the prototype integrated both
credential-based and experience-based trust models in a single framework. We opti-
mized the framework and did some assumptions during implementation taking into
account power and computational limitations of mobile devices. The ﬁnal prototype
was able to verify, validate RTML with weight credentials pushed to or pulled by
the mobile device. Applying inference rules to RT credentials and local access rules,
the deduction engine returned the complete set of the requestor attributes with as-
signed trust values and consequently access permissions. We did some performance
tests to measure applicability of the framework.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we recall the role-based trust
management framework. In Section 3 we show its ﬂexible extension with weights
and the corresponding evaluations algorithm. We then show the prototype imple-
mentation on mobile devices in Section 4. Example of credentials, policy statements
and some performance evaluation are given in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 contains
our conclusions and future work.
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2 Role-based Trust Management
The RT Role-based Trust-management framework for access control provides pol-
icy language, semantics, deduction engine, and concrete tools such as application
domain speciﬁcation documents which help distributed users to maintain consistent
use of policy terms (e.g., see [7,11]). RT purpose is to manage access control and au-
thorization problems in large-scale and decentralized system. Such problems came
out when independent and autonomous organizations, whose membership change
very rapidly, wish to share their resources. RT combines the strength of Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC) and trust-management (TM). RBAC was developed for
access control in a single organization in which the control of role membership and
role permissions is relatively centralized in a few users, RT takes from it the notion
of role as instrument to assign permissions to users. TM is an approach to dis-
tributed access control and authorization in which access control decision are taken
on the base of policy statements made by multiple principals. From TM, RT takes
the principles of managing distributed authority through the use of credentials, as
well as some notation denoting relationships between those authorities. The main
concept in RT is the notion of roles, each RT principal has its own name space for
roles, and each role is compounded by the principal name and a role term. For
example, if KA is a principal and R is a role term, then KA.R is the role R de-
ﬁned by principal KA and can be read as KA’s R role. Only KA has the authority
to issue policy statements deﬁning which are the members for the role KA.R. A
role in RBAC can be viewed as a set of principals who are members of this role.
Granting a permission to a principal means to making the principal a member of
the set corresponding to the permission, granting a permission to a role implies the
assertion that the set corresponding to the permission includes as a subset the set
corresponding to the role.
2.1 Parametric Roles
Roles in RBAC are atomic strings, sometimes this fact should be too limited. Could
be desirable to use the same name for a large numbers of roles with few diﬀerences
among them. To address this feature RT introduced the notion of parameterized
role with the following data types:
• Integer types. An integer type is ordered.
• Closed enumeration types. Could be both ordered and unordered.
• Open enumeration types. An Open enumeration type is unordered.
• Float types. A ﬂoat type is ordered.
• Date and time types. There are predeﬁned types and they are ordered.
A role term takes the form r(p1, ..., pn), in which r is a role name, and each pj takes
one of the following three forms: name = c, name = X and name ∈ S, where
name is the name of a parameter of r, c is a constant of the appropriate type, X is
a variable and S is a value set of the appropriate type. Variables make equal two
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parameters in the same role deﬁnition.
2.2 RTML credentials
An RT credential has an head and a body. The head of a credential has the form
A.r(p1, ..., pn), in which A is an entity, and r(p1, ..., pn) is a role name. For each i
in 1...n, pi is a data term having the type of the ith parameter of r. A data term
could be either a constant or a variable. A credential with the head A.r(h1, ...hn)
defines the role A.r(h1, ...hn). A is the issuer of the credential. In the following are
presented into an abstract syntax six types of credentials, each having a diﬀerent
form of body corresponding to a diﬀerent way of deﬁning role membership.
• Simple Member A.r(p =′ value′)← D
The credential issuer is A and the role membership includes the D principal (A and
D are possibly the same). In general a Simple Member represents a certiﬁcation
about which roles has been acquired by a user, it is signed by the entity who
released this roles. The body part is a Principal identiﬁer.
• Simple Containment A.r ← B.r1
An ExternalRole is the body part of the credential. A deﬁnes that the role
membership includes all entities included in the external r1 role issued by the B
principal (A and B are possibly the same). The dimension of A.r should be no
less than that of B.r1.
• Linked Containment A.r ← A.r1.r2
The body part consists of a LinkedRole element, which contains two or more
elements. The credential issuer is A and the role membership includes all entities
from the external r2 role issued by the P principal where P is a member of r1 of
the default principal A. The dimension of A.r should be no less than that of P.r2
• Intersection Containment A.r ← A.r1 ∩B.r2
The body part consists of an Intersection element, which contains two or more
roles; it could be an external role if the referred role is issued by an external entity
or it could issued by A itself. The role membership includes all entities which are
simultaneously members from the internal r1 role and the external r2 role issued
by the B principal.
The following two deﬁnitions can be express using the previous rules:
• Simple Delegation A.r ⇐ B[: r2]
The credential issuer is A who delegates its authority over r to B, in other words,
A trusts B’s judgment on assigning members to r. When r2 is present it works as
a sort of control; B can only assign members of A.r2 to A.r. A Simple Delegation
could be expressed using a Simple Containment and an Intersection Containment:
A.r ← B.r ∩A.r2
• Advanced Delegation A.r ⇐ r1[: B.r2]
The credential issuer is A who delegates its authority over r to members of A.r1.
When B.r2 is present it works as a sort of control; each member of A.r1 can
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only assign members of B.r2 to A.r. In other words an Advanced Delegation
could be expressed using a Linked Containment and an Intersection Containment:
A.r ← A.r.r1 ∩B.r2
2.3 XML syntax for credentials
RTML is an XML-based data representation for RT policies and credentials which
implements the RT framework. It includes data types to encode permissions, a
mechanism for identifying principals, data-structures to deﬁne a common vocabu-
lary and a semantic relation that determines when, given a set of policy statements
and a set of user credentials, a query is true. RTML uses three types of document:
• ApplicationDomainSpeciﬁcation
Deﬁnes a suite of related data types and role names, called a vocabulary. The use
of a role name needs to refer to the ADSD in which the role name is declared.
• Credentials
Deﬁnes one or more credentials issued by an entity, this document should be
signed by the entity who released these credentials.
• AccessRules
Deﬁnes the rules which control the access to a role or group.
In the following we describe these documents.
2.3.1 Application Domain Speciﬁcation Document (ADSD)
As previously disclosed, the use of a shared vocabulary constitutes a critical point
in those systems which represent the rights as attributes, such as the Grid environ-
ment. To delegate permissions on resources, all the principals involved in the chain
need to use consistent terminology to specify resource permissions and delegation
conditions. If some of them use incompatible schemes, their credentials cannot be
meaningfully combined and some intended permissions cannot be granted. The def-
inition of a role is meaningful only if all the parts involved are allowed to access
the role structure and possibly the permissions granted to it. An ADSD deﬁnes a
vocabulary which implements this structure using standard data type or deﬁning
new ones, this document has to be public. This grants RT to have a strongly typed
credentials and policies. A credential which uses a role term needs to refer the
particular ADSD which deﬁnes the role name and all its data types.
2.3.2 Credential documents
In a ”trust-management” approach, a requester sends a request to an authorizer
who speciﬁes an access-policy, expressed as a set of access rules, which govern
the accesses to protect resources. The requester adds a set of credentials to the
request and the authorizer decides whether to authorize this request by answering
the question: ”Do the access rules and credentials authorize the request?”.
Credential and AccessRules have the same structure; they deﬁne one or more
rule contained into a root-element called CredentialStore tag:
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<CredentialStore >
<Credential id=’#1’>. . .</Credential>
. . .
<Credential id=’#n’>. . .</Credential>
</CredentialStore>
Each rule deﬁnition is compound of three elements.
(i) Prologue
It contains all the informations used afterwords in the document, it counts a
DefaultDomain and zero or more ImportDomain which refers all the ADSDs
necessary to recover the structure of all the roles involved, one or more Principal
containing the public key of the entities in the credential and a Issuer that
points to the Principal who issued the role, it could be an IntegerValue or
a StringValue but it has to be a KeyValue as deﬁned in the XML Signature
Standard to oﬀer guarantee of security.
(ii) Credential
RTML deﬁnes a set of Credential/AccessRule deﬁnition, each containing a
HeadRoleTerm and a body. Diﬀerent kinds of deﬁnitions contain diﬀerent el-
ements as the body part. We adopt an abstract syntax in describing these
deﬁnitions; r represents the HeadRoleTerm, r1 and r2 represents other role
terms, we assume A as the credential issuer while B and D represent generic
issuers.
(iii) VeriﬁcationData
It contains a ValidityTime element, and an optional signature part consisting
of a Signature element as speciﬁed in the XML Signature Standard.
2.3.3 AccessRule Documents
As already expressed in 2.3.2, Credential and AccessRule documents have the same
structure. The main diﬀerence consists that the Issuer value is not present in the
AccessRule document; it deﬁnes a policy and the issuer of these rules is the policy
issuer itself. Furthermore the Signature element is missed too, the issuer does not
need to verify its policy.
3 Extension with weights
In our framework, reputation of users can be calculated according to properties that
a user possesses with respect to services, rather than a role that he/she covers. As
an example, reputation of a user can be calculated based on past experiences of
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other services with respect to that user. The more the user has been well-behaved
with that service, the more the service will positively recommend interactions with
that user. Thus, by rephrasing what stated above, a simple member credential
A.r(v)← D can be read as A asserts that D has property r with degree (weight) v.
Services emit two kinds of credentials, either expressing trust towards good be-
haviors of users, or recommending someone able to express that a user has a good
behavior. The ﬁrst kind of credentials expresses trust towards a functionality (e.g.,
towards good behaviors), and we denote them by A.f(v)← D, i.e., A trusts D for
performing functionality f with degree v. The latter are credentials of recommen-
dation, denoted as A.rf(v) ← D, and they express the fact that A trusts D as a
recommender able to suggest someone for performing f .
Recommendations can be transitive. The transitivity step is encoded into RT
by a linking containment of the form A.rf ← A.rf.rf . This statement says that if
A deﬁnes B to have property A.rf , and B deﬁnes D to have property B.rf , then
A deﬁnes D to have role A.rf , i.e., D is trusted to act as a recommender according
to A.
The indirect functional trust step is encoded as A.f ← A.rf.f . This statement
says that if B has role A.rf and C has role B.f then C has role A.f . B, that
has the role A.rf , is the recommender, i.e., A trust B for choosing someone that
is trusted for performing f . C, that has role B.f , is trusted to perform f by B.
Hence, C is indirectly trusted to perform f by A.
Also, one can deﬁne a set of functionalities, e.g., a range of possible values for
f , and the relative simple containment credentials are, e.g., as follows:
• A.files(p, v)← D. A trusts user D with degree v for operating on a ﬁle.
• A.socket(p, v)← D. A trusts user D with degree v for operating on a socket.
There must be explicit rules for combining trust weights. Thus, we consider
two operators, namely the link operator ⊗ and the aggregation operator , for
combining the trust measures. Generally speaking, the former is used to compose
trust weights, while the latter is used to compare, select or aggregate trust weights.
We give some speciﬁc examples of semiring-based trust measures. Assume that we
want to consider the weight with maximal trust, then:
• ⊗ is the multiplication on real numbers (for instance between 0 and 1);
•  is the maximum between two real numbers.
Here, we recall the language given in [10], for enriching part of RTML with trust
measures.
• A.r(p, v)← D. The role A.r(p) is covered with weight v.
• A.r(p)←v2 A1.r1(p1). According to A, all members of role A1.r1(p1) with weight
v1 are members of role A.r(p) with weight v = v1 ⊗ v2.
• A.r(p)← A.r1(p1).r2(p2). If B has role A1.r1(p1) with weight v1 and D has role
B.r2(p2) with weight v2, then D has role A.r(p) with weight v = v1 ⊗ v2.
• A.r(p) ← A1.r1(p1) ∩A2.r2(p2). This statement deﬁnes that if D has both roles
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A1.r1(p1) with weight v1 and A2.r2(p2) with weight v2, then D has role A.r(p)
with weight v = v1  v2.
Note that weights must not explicitly appear in the simple, linking and intersec-
tion containment statements. Indeed, these statements combine basic credentials
(the simple member ones) and they determine how weights from the basic creden-
tials must be combined too.
3.1 An implementation of RTML with trust measures
We present an algorithm for calculating a set of simple member credentials with
trust measures on RTML. Figure 1 shows algorithm’s details. It takes as input the
available credentials, split in two sets, the set of basic credentials and the others. If
one does not consider trust measures, the algorithm basically builds the minimal set
of simple member credentials by iteratively applying the inference rules for each kind
of credential. If the inferred credential does not belong yet to the set of computed
basic credentials, then it is added to this set. The procedure is iterated until no new
credentials are found. When the algorithm is applied to a ﬁnite set of credentials,
it correctly terminates.
Adding weights is possible. Indeed, due to the speciﬁc nature of c-semirings
we are going to apply, it can be also seen as a variant of the Floyd algorithm
for calculating minimal/maximal weighted paths among all the nodes in a graph.
Indeed, a simple member credential, say A.r(v)← C, states that between the node
A and the node C there is an arc labeled r and with measure v. If we assume the
order ≤w among weights deﬁned as v1 ≤w v2 iﬀ v1  v2 = v2, then the algorithm
computes the greatest weighted path (w.r.t. ≤w) in the graph. We remind that in
c-semiring ⊗ is an inclusive operation.
4 Prototype Implementation on Mobile Devices
This section outlines the ongoing implementation of the RT with trust weights on
mobile devices supported J2ME platform and CLDC1.1/MIDP2.0 proﬁles. The
extended version of the prototype was initially implemented as a part of the au-
thorization framework for GRID services [4]. The prototype was modiﬁed due to
minimize of the size of the ﬁnal application and taking into account J2ME limita-
tions. Java language was chosen for its suitability in developing and testing mobile
applications. Moreover, several simulation environments are freely available (e.g.
NetBeans), and a wide set of mobile devices like Smartphones and PDAs are able
to execute MIDlets.
RT framework consists of (i) XML-based user’s credentials expressed in RTML
policy language formats; (ii) local XML-based access rules or policy statements
saved on a mobile device and managing an access to some particular resource;
(iii) a deduction engine. The deduction engine discovers new user’s attributes or
roles inferred from access rules and credentials. Applying inference rules to every
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Trust Calculations (basic creds, rules)= {
Results:=basic creds; Changed := true;
While(Changed) {
Changed:=false;
For each credential A.r ←v2 A1.r1 in rules and for each credential
A.r1(v1)← C in basic creds
if A.r ← C not in basic creds, or A.r(v)← C in basic creds with
not v1 ⊗ v2 ≤w v
then {remove from basic creds all the creds like A.r ← C;
insert A.r(v1 ⊗ v2)← C in basic creds; Changed:=true};
For each credential A.r ← A.r1.r2 in rules and for each credential
A.r1(v1)← B, B.r2(v2)← C in basic creds
if A.r ← C not in basic creds, or A.r(v)← C in basic creds with
not v1 ⊗ v2 ≤w v
then {remove from basic creds all the creds like A.r ← C;
insert A.r(v1 ⊗ v2)← C in basic creds; Changed:=true};
For each credential A.r ← A1.r1 ∩A2.r2 in rules and for each credential
A1.r1(v1)← C, A.r2(v2)← C in basic creds
if A.r ← C not in basic creds, or A.r(v)← C in basic creds with
not v1  v2 ≤w v
then {remove from basic creds all the creds like A.r ← C;
insert A.r(v1  v2)← C in basic creds; Changed:=true};
}
Fig. 1. Algorithm for credential inference.
Fig. 2. RT framework with weights for mobile devices
credential and access rule the deduction engine returns the complete set of the user’s
attributes. We did assumption about centralized credential’s repository from which
credentials can be pushed or pulled to mobile device over Bluetooth connection link.
The complete software packages structure of the implemented prototype shown
in the ﬁgure 2. The packages supplied RT framework functionality by verifying,
validating, parsing signed XML-based user’s credentials and access rules and eval-
uating new credentials by the deduction engine.
Any user’s credential could be presented as a single XML ﬁle. To ensure in-
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tegrity all credentials were digitally signed. The XML Digital Signature standard 4
with some extensions (RFC-4050) was used for credentials signing. Cryptographic
algorithms for J2ME were imported from bouncy castle project 5 . The signature
was kept into the Signature Value tag of XML encoded credential representation.
Public key of the credential holder was settled at KeyInfo tag. Xerces-jme 6 , xalan-
jme 7 , bc-jme and signit-mobile-xml packages prepared the input to rtml-parser by
verifying the credentials signature and expiration time, extracting the related XML
code, and saving credentials in a local KeyStore holding access rules and protected
by the password.
The rtml-parser is a DOM-based parser which converted received credentials
and access rules from XML-format into a complex data structure and passed it to
the deduction engine implemented by chain-discovery-weight package.
Chain-discovery-weight evaluated new credentials based on the initials creden-
tials and access rules. It also implemented the algorithm described in section 3.1
assigning properly a trust weight to every new credential. Chain-discovery-weight
maintained the ﬁnal set of credentials wit trust measures. Initially, weights were
assigned to credentials and access rules by random values before sending to the
deduction engine. We did so in order to keep the original RTML format of the
credentials. The new user’s credentials denoted a complete set of roles a user held
on the mobile device. This information might be used to grant to the user some
access permissions.
5 Performance evaluation
We performed some experiments on Nokia E-61 Smartphone to measure the perfor-
mance of the prototype.
Working algorithms of the prototype, as mentioned before, included several steps
and was as follows: (i) to upload a set of user’s credentials to the mobile device
via Bluetooth; (ii) to validate and verify a signature and time expiration of each
credential on the mobile device; (iii) to parse credentials and corresponding access
rules from XML-based format to a logical structure understandable by the deduction
engine; (iv) to push credentials and access rules to the deduction engine to evaluate
a set of all user’s credentials and trust weights assigned to it.
We measured time consumptions for step (ii) till (iv) varying the number of
credentials and access rules. We used combinations of 4 user’s credentials and 3
policy rules to test the prototype. Due to space limitations we do not present here
XML version of credentials, its deﬁnition and assigned weights. We refer a reader
to [5], where the similar example was considered in details. The credentials and
access rules used in the prototype are enlisted below:
Credentials:
4 http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3275.txt
5 http://www.bouncycastle.org/
6 http://xerces.apache.org/xerces-j/
7 http://xml.apache.org/xalan-j/
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Fig. 3. Credentials management performance
(0) KStateU .stagist(
′BobSmith′,′ StateU ′)← KBob
(1) KStateU .student(
′StateU ′,′ InformaticScience′,′ 123456789′ ,′ BobSmith′) ←
KBob
(2) KAcm.acmmember(
′BobSmith′,′ Professional′,′ UJ11111′)← KBob
(3) KAbu.university(
′StateU ′)← KStateU
Access rules:
(4) KEPub.epubRole1() ← KAcm.acmmember(name,−,−) ∩
KEPub.student(−,
′ InformaticScience′,−, name)
(5) KEPub.university(uniName)⇐ KAbu
(6) KEPub.student(uniName,
′ InformaticScience′,′ 123456789′ ,−) ⇐
KEPub.university(uniName)
For example, passing (3) and (5), the deduction engine generates the new
credential:
(7) KEPub.university(
′StateU ′)← KStateU
One set of experiments was done to evaluate time costs of credentials veriﬁcation
and validation and parsing. Obtained results for 1 and 7 credentials is presented
in ﬁgure 3. As shown in the ﬁgure, time for validation-veriﬁcation of 1 credential
was almost 11.0 seconds while parsing only 1.6 seconds. The time had a linear
dependence on the number of credentials to be processed.
Figure 4 presents performance of the deduction engine for the case of 2 (1
credential and 1 access rule) and for the case of 7 (4 credentials and 3 access rules)
policy statements. It shows that evaluation time almost remained on the same value
and formed 28 seconds delay for 7 policies statements.
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Fig. 4. The deduction engine performance
Running several experiments on a real devices we inferred that the credential
veriﬁcation and validation time expenses are very sensitive. The overall time ex-
penses are acceptable only for speciﬁc application but can not be used, for example,
to monitor run-time executions.
6 Conclusions and future work
In this paper, we have introduced implementation of RT framework on mobile
devices. Trust weights were embedded into the RT credentials to supply certain
reputation and recommendation models. We presented the algorithm to compute
weights and ran some experiments to test the prototype performance. Obtained
results showed that credentials veriﬁcation and validation were the most time con-
suming comparing to credentials and access rules parsing and evaluation.
We plan to reduce time expenses by using light cryptographic signing algorithms
and developing an adoptive caching model for credentials veriﬁcation and validation.
Finally, we concern about a complex case study expressing beneﬁts of RT with
weights. We suspect a Grid scenario to examine interoperability of RT framework
deployed on various devices.
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